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Abstract 
 
Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public 
official are most corrupt and why. I distinguish between the bribery rate and the 
size of bribes received, and seek to explain the variation in each across public 
institutions. The characteristics of officials’ clients explain most of the variation 
for bribery rates, but none for bribe amounts. A measure of the speed of honest 
service at the institution explains much of the remaining variation for both bribery 
rates  and  amounts.  The  results  indicate  that  the  bribery  rate  is  higher  at 
institutions with bribe-prone clients, and that bribery rates and bribe amounts are 
higher where clients are frustrated at slow service. Faster and better service would 
reduce corruption. Overall, the judiciary and the police are by far the most corrupt 
institutions. 
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In  all  countries,  some  public  officials  are  more  corrupt  than  others  depending  upon 
variations in the opportunities for private gain and the willingness to pay of private citizens and 
businesses. Effective anti-corruption campaigns need to be able both to identify which types of 
officials are most likely to be corrupt and to understand why some, such as the judiciary or the 
police,  are  more  corrupt  than  others.  A  number  of  surveys  report  household  and  business 
perceptions of corruption across official types, but these data provide no information on why one 
type of official is more susceptible to corruption than another. One is left with plausible, but 
empirically untested, theoretical speculations. Newly available Peruvian data permit analysis of 
this very important issue. In this paper I use the data both to measure corruption by type of 
official and to seek the causes of corruption across official types.   
The  existing  literature  has  uncovered  some  determinants  of  corruption using  a  cross-
section of countries. Factors found to be associated with lower corruption include a common law 
legal  system,  Protestant  traditions  and  British  colonial  rule  (Treisman  2000),  fiscal 
decentralization  (Fisman  and  Gatti  2000),  higher  relative  salaries  for  public  officials  (van 
Rijckeghem and Weder 2001), the absence of an industrial policy (Ades and Di Tella 1997) and 
a greater presence of women in parliament and the civil service (Swamy et al. 2001). Most of 
these  causes  vary  only  at  the  country  level  and  most  are  not  amenable  to  direct  policy 
interventions. My data allow me to study determinants of corruption whose natural variation is 
across official types; this gives new insights into the causes of corruption and generates some 
practical policy implications.
1 
                                                 
1 The World Bank has conducted surveys of public officials in several countries, and qualitative 
responses  related  to  corruption  are  available  at  www1.worldbank.org/prem/acr/bankproj.html. 
Peru is not one of the countries surveyed.  2 
My data are from the national household survey of Peru, a middle-ranking country in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2004). 
Concern about corruption led the Peruvian statistical agency to include a detailed module on 
bribery in the 2002 and 2003 household surveys, measuring usage rates and reports of bribery for 
twenty-one types of public official. The questions pertain to the previous twelve months, and the 
official types are specific Peruvian institutions, such as the judiciary or the social security agency 
(political parties and the legislature are not among the specified types). Thus the emphasis is on 
reports of actual experience, not perceptions, of corruption.
2 
To establish a corruption ranking by official type, I calculate the ratio of an institution’s 
share of bribe takings to its share of household/official interactions. This measure corrects for the 
fact that an institution might appear to be relatively honest simply because few households even 
interact with officials from that institution. By this measure, the judiciary is by far the most 
corrupt official type in Peru, with an impressive 42 per cent of reported bribe revenues compared 
to only 2 per cent of interactions. The police force is the other extremely corrupt institution, with 
27 per cent of bribes and only 2 per cent of interactions (see Table 1 below). Transparency 
International (2004) reports that in 36 of 62 countries surveyed, respondents perceived the police 
and the judiciary to be the most corrupt institutions after political parties and the legislature.  
This  indicates  that  the  Peruvian  situation  is  not  unique  and  could  provide  lessons  for  other 
countries. 
There are a number of reasons why corruption might vary across official types. First, the 
services offered may be demanded by clients with different ability and willingness to pay or even 
                                                 
2 The few previous papers using measured corruption include Hunt (2004), Hunt and Laszlo 
(2005), Mocan (2004), Svensson (2003) and some analysis in Swamy et al. (2001). Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2003) convincingly infer corruption from their data. 3 
different  scruples.    Officials  have  some  monopoly  power  and  can  charge  different  prices 
(including zero) to different clients for their services (price-discrimination). We would expect 
officials in institutions with richer clients to take bribes more frequently and to take larger bribes. 
Jennifer Hunt and Sonia Laszlo (2005) have confirmed empirically that richer clients do pay 
more frequent and higher bribes, both in general and within official type.  
Second, officials provide different types of services in return for bribes, and these vary in 
value. This influences the client’s willingness to bribe as well as the level of payoffs. Bribes vary 
in size both because the value of the ultimate benefit varies and because officials’ ability to 
provide the benefit promptly also varies. The latter, in turn, depends on three considerations: 
how many officials are involved in the conclusion of business for one client, how easy it is for 
superiors  to  monitor  officials,  and  the  resources  available  to  the  institution  compared  to  the 
demands on its officials. For example, police officers, who often meet clients one-on-one in the 
street,  have  complete  control  over  the  imposition  of  fines  and  are  hard  to  monitor.    If  the 
resources  of  the  agency  granting  drivers’  licenses  are  insufficient  to  prevent  large  queues 
forming, the conditions will be ripe for frustrated clients to bribe to get to the head of the queue.
3 
Third,  institutions  vary  in  the  degree  of  internal  competition  between  officials  with 
different levels of scruples. For example, a customer wishing to have a telephone connected who 
encounters an official demanding a bribe could return the next day and hope for an official with 
more scruples. By contrast, in a court case brought before a judge, it will usually be impossible 
to  choose  another  judge  unless  he  or  she  is  caught  explicitly  demanding  a  payoff.
4  Fourth, 
                                                 
3 Bardhan (1997) discusses how giving many officials the power to stop a file may backfire as a 
means of reducing bribery if the client ends up bribing all the officials. Rose-Ackerman (1978) 
and Lui (1985) analyze bribery and queuing. 
4 Rose-Ackerman (1978: chapter 8, 1999: chapter 4) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) discuss the 
significance of competition between officials. 4 
institutions may vary in the degree to which combating corruption is a management priority. 
Finally,  public  officials  with  few  scruples  will  migrate  to  institutions  which  offer  more 
opportunities for corruption, reinforcing other patterns.  
The Peruvian data permit me to quantify the impact of three factors: the direct effect of 
client characteristics, the indirect effect of client characteristics, and the share of client cases that 
officials acting honestly are able to conclude within the twelve-month  window, adjusted for 
client characteristics (the “adjusted conclusion rate”). The direct impact of client characteristics 
indicates  whether  the  price-discrimination  model  helps  to  explain  cross-official  corruption. 
Client  scruples  are,  of  course,  unobservable,  so  their  impact  cannot  be  judged.  I  assess  the 
indirect or spillover effects of the client characteristics by asking if the characteristics of the 
average  client  who  deals  with  a  given  official  type  has  an  impact  on  corruption  even  after 
household  characteristics  are  taken  into  account.  This  captures  whether  official/client 
interactions are influenced by the characteristics of other clients. This could happen if rich clients 
corrupt  officials  so  they  behave  less  scrupulously  with  all  clients,  or  if  rich  clients  attract 
unscrupulous  officials  to  the  institution.  The  adjusted  conclusion  rate  is  designed  to  capture 
administrative efficiency, resources and lack of red tape.  
Raw bribery rates across official types range from almost zero to 37 per cent, and client 
characteristics  explain  85  per  cent  of  the  variance  in  these  rates.    Nevertheless,  even  after 
correcting for differences in client characteristics, adjusted bribery rates still span 15 percentage 
points. Fully 46 per cent of this variance is explained by the adjusted conclusion rate: a 10 
percentage point increase in this rate (a standard deviation) reduces the adjusted bribery rate by 
4-5 percentage points, a very large effect. This is a causal effect as long as the conclusion rate of 
officials acting honestly is not affected by the extent of bribery in their institution. The results 5 
indicate that bribery rates are higher at institutions whose clients have a bribe-prone profile and 
whose clients are frustrated with slow service. Policy priorities for reducing the bribery rate 
should be improving administrative efficiency, providing more resources and cutting red tape.  
The data reveal that neither raw bribery rates and bribe amounts nor rates and amounts 
adjusted for client characteristics are closely correlated across official types. Adjusting for client 
characteristics does not reduce the variance in bribe amounts across official type. However, a 10 
percentage point increase in the adjusted conclusion rate reduces the adjusted bribe amount by a 
significant 30-32 per cent and explains at least 20 per cent of the variance. The results indicate 
that while differences in client profiles do not help explain the variation in bribe amounts by 
official type, clients frustrated with slow service pay higher and more frequent bribes.   
I find some evidence that there is a role for spillover effects between clients in explaining 
both bribery rates and average bribe amounts. However, the results differ qualitatively between 
the  bribery  rate  and  bribe  amount  outcomes,  and  are  difficult  to  interpret.  I  draw  no  firm 
conclusions. 
Most of the high bribery rate for both the police and the judiciary is explained by the 
higher propensity to bribe (whether voluntarily or not) of their clients. That different clients use 
different types of official is not something that can or should be changed. However, the relatively 
high bribery rate of the judiciary, after adjusting for client characteristics, seems to be adequately 
explained by the judiciary’s low conclusion rate (54 per cent, compared to 93 per cent for clients 
in the whole sample). The low conclusion rate also helps explain the very high value of bribes 
received by the judiciary. A key policy challenge for Peru is to train more lawyers and judges for 
permanent  positions,  so  as  to  speed  up  judicial  proceedings  without  sacrificing  quality.  The 
police, in contrast, have a much higher bribery rate, adjusted for observable client characteristics, 6 
than  their  conclusion  rate  would  predict.  Although  increasing  the  conclusion  rate  would  be 
helpful, the need for additional measures is even more urgent than for other institutions.  These 
might include attempts to restrict abuse of police monopoly power, for example, by limiting the 
extortion of bribes from innocent motorists.  
 
Corruption in Peru 
Discoveries leading to the resignation and self-exile of the president, Alberto Fujimori, revealed 
the enormous scale of grand corruption in Peru. Video-taped evidence showed that Vladimir 
Montesinos,  Fujimori's  spy  chief,  had  repeatedly  bribed  congressmen  to  defect  to  Fujimori's 
party to ensure its majority in Congress. In addition, large bribes had enabled Montesinos to 
control most of the media and influence the judiciary (McMillan and Zoido 2004). 
However,  Fujimori  is  credited  with  having  reduced  petty  corruption.  His  1990-2000 
administration pursued policies that reduced the role of government, which he justified not only 
on efficiency grounds, but on the grounds that reducing the role of government would reduce 
opportunities  for  corruption.  He  attempted  to  reduce  corruption  in  the  police  and  municipal 
governments, in the latter case by establishing a supervisory agency to field citizen complaints. 
However, despite some  progress, several institutions with which ordinary  people have much 
contact were judged to suffer from pervasive corruption by Transparency International (TI) in a 
November 2001 report.
5  
Fujimori’s reforms of the judiciary are thought to have been ineffective and may even 
have made it more corrupt. An increase in the number of temporary judges, appointed in part to 
help  clear  backlogs,  contributed  to  corruption.  Such  judges,  representing  74  per  cent  of  all 
judges, were vulnerable to political pressure and susceptible to corruption because of their lack 
                                                 
5 Most of the rest of this section is based on this report: Transparency International (2001).  7 
of job security.  The slowness of judicial proceedings (and, one suspects, the high corruption) has 
led to the establishment of various arbitration systems for settling disputes (U.S. Department of 
State 2005). 
TI argues that poor pay and equipment reduced the morale of the police, which combined 
with weak internal controls and sanctions, rendered them susceptible to small- and large-scale 
corruption, as well as to cooperation with criminals. At the time of its report, TI found that it was 
customary to bribe the transit police. 
Public  administration  generally  was  corrupted  by  poor  pay,  complex  procedures  for 
sanctioning  bribe-taking  and  the  frequent  overturning  of  administrative  sanctions  by  the 
judiciary. Only public servants with contracts comparable to those in the private sector were 
well-paid, but they lacked the job security that would protect them from political interference 
(and, presumably, that would allow them to report corruption by superiors). 
The interim regime and the presidency of Alejandro Toledo that followed Fujimori’s 
downfall both made corruption a priority, but they focused particularly on prosecuting actors in 
the Montesinos affair. Nevertheless, a group including representatives of civil society and the 
World Bank drew up a list of anti-corruption proposals in 2001. Some initiatives put into place 
include the naming of an “Anti-Corruption Tsar”, the establishment of a special anti-corruption 
police division and the introduction of an anti-nepotism law for the public service. Ominously, 
however,  the  Tsar  was  fired  in  December  2004  after  seeking  to  investigate  accusations  of 
corruption in the Toledo administration.
6 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20041217-0702-peru-corruption.html 8 
Data 
The  basic  data  for  this  study  are  contained  in  the  2002  and  2003  waves  of  the  Peruvian 
household  survey,  the  Encuesta  Nacional  de  Hogares  (ENAHO),  conducted  by  the  national 
statistical  agency,  the  Instituto  Nacional  de  Estadística  e  Información  (INEI).  The  sample 
includes  responses  by  more  than  36  000  households  to  a  large  number  of  economic  and 
demographic  questions  and  to  questions  on  the  use  and  bribery  of  public  officials.  One 
respondent per household indicated for each of twenty-one official types and for the previous 
twelve months whether the household had interacted with the official; whether anyone in the 
household had paid a bribe or been asked to pay a bribe; if they had paid, how much they had 
paid, and whether they had concluded their business with the official. The only missing aspect of 
bribery is the case of the client offering a bribe and the official refusing. The 2002 survey was 
conducted  in  October,  November  and  December  2002,  while  the  “2003”  survey  was  spread 
evenly across the period May 2003 to April 2004.  
Overall, 4.9 per cent of households report having bribed in the previous twelve months. 
Of households who had used at least one public official, 5.7 per cent had bribed. Although the 
share of households bribing may seem low, the bribery rates for some official types are very 
high, indicating that, at least for some official types, respondents were not ashamed or afraid to 
admit  having  bribed.  The  number  of  bribery  episodes  is  somewhat  understated,  however, 
because each respondent can only report one bribery episode per official per year. If clients 
commonly use agents to act as intermediaries between themselves and officials, and bribes paid 
by the agent  are reported in the survey by the  agent (or no-one), rather than the  client, the 
understatement will be worse and the share of households bribing will also be understated. A 
2003 survey by Proética, a Peruvian anti-corruption group, gathered information on bribes and 
agents (“tramitadores”) (Proética 2003). Fifty-two per cent of respondents who had bribed to 9 
obtain a driver’s licence reported having paid the bribe to an agent, while the share was 15 per 
cent or less for the other nine activities reported in the summary statistics (including dealing with 
a judge, customs, police on patrol and transit fines).
7 
A 2004 Transparency International survey of 416 respondents in greater Lima found 14 
per cent of respondents had bribed in the previous twelve months, compared to 6.0 per cent 
among the 3758 Lima respondents in my 2002-2003 data. However, the TI question did not 
restrict itself to bribes paid to public officials. Proética reports much higher bribery rates for the 
years 2002, 2003 and 2004 of 32 per cent, 29 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively (Proética 
2004). Proética’s bribery rates, conditional on the use of particular officials, look very similar to 
mine, but their usage rates look implausibly high for a window of one year. For example, in 
2004, 24 per cent report using a judge compared to 2 per cent in my sample; 14 per cent of those 
who used a judge report having bribed in this connection in the Proética sample, compared to 17 
per cent in my data. This suggests that the Proética time frame, not reported in the documentation 
available  to  me,  was  in  fact  much  longer  than  a  year,  even  though  yearly  bribery  rates  are 
reported. I prefer my own survey to the TI and Proética surveys because of its large sample, 
wealth of covariates and additional questions on the bribery and usage of public officials. 
 
Which official types are most corrupt? 
Table 1 lists the twenty-one official types in order of their share of total bribery “episodes”. A 
bribery episode is an encounter between a household (client) and official in which either a bribe 
was paid or a bribe was solicited by the official but the client refused to pay. Column 1 reports 
these  shares,  based  on  91  668  total  encounters  between  households  and  officials  and  1628 
                                                 
7 Bertrand et al. (2005) analyze the use of agents for obtaining drivers’ licenses in India. 
 10 
bribery  episodes.  The  police  account  for  35  per  cent  of  bribes  and  the  city  (municipal) 
government  for  21  per  cent,  with  the  judiciary  in  third  rank  with  12  per  cent.  These  three 
institutions account for 68 per cent of bribery episodes. Column 2 shows that these institutions 
are even more dominant in terms of total bribe payments: the judiciary alone accounts for 42 per 
cent of the money paid in bribes, followed by the police with 27 per cent and city government 
with 11 per cent, making a total of 80 per cent. The third column puts these shares in perspective 
by reporting the official type’s share in household/official interactions: that is, the number of 
households using the official divided by the total over all official types. The police and judiciary 
represent only 2 per cent each of interactions with officials, while the city government has a 
higher 10 per cent share.  
The data are sufficiently detailed that there could be many ways to combine them to 
produce a measure of how corruption varies by official type. Presumably corruption is some 
combination of the bribery rate and the average level of bribes paid.
8 As a simple summary 
measure, I divide column 2 of Table 1, essentially the product of the rate and the amount, by 
column 3, the usage rate of various types of officials. The results are displayed in column 4 of 
Table 1 and in Figure 1.  
By this measure, the judiciary is by far the most corrupt institution, with bribery levels 
twenty-six times the level that its usage rate would predict. The police force is also an outlier 
with about half the corruption of the judiciary. The next official type is “other”, with one third 
the police corruption rate, but four times the next category. “Other” includes the Ministry of 
Transport and Communication, which houses the agency that grants drivers’ licenses. Here the 
use of agents might be expected to lead to an underestimation of bribery. The “other” category 
                                                 
8 Quid pro quos, not directly observable in the data, can also play a role. See Hunt (2004). 11 
also  encompasses  numerous  small  welfare  programs  as  well  as  congress,  the  office  of  the 
president and the many unspecified ministries such as the Ministry of Energy and Mines. It is 
possible that corruption is high for this category because those who paid a bribe are more likely 
to remember having used an unspecified official type.  
Corruption in other institutions is relatively modest compared to the top three although all 
these institutions carry out tasks that might lead to bribery. For example, the city government 
provides a variety of bribery-prone services such as construction and demolition permission, 
trash collection and title to property. Arbitration is to some extent a substitute for the judiciary. 
The  Ministry  of  Agriculture  provides  title  to  agricultural  land  and  credit  to  farmers.  The 
Department of Migration provides visas for foreign workers and passports.  
The  election  “office”  in  Table  1  is  the  Oficina  Nacional  de  Processos  Electorales 
(ONPE), while the election “court” is the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE). The election 
office (ONPE) runs elections, while the election court (JNE), which employs many lawyers, 
deals with electoral justice. The main reason for someone to use and bribe the election office 
(ONPE) would be to obtain a sticker confirming that he or she had participated in the mandatory 
voting (failure to obtain the sticker results in a suspension of legal rights). The election court 
(JNE) can issue exemptions and deals with any disputes over electoral outcomes or eligibility. 
Most activity connected with the national elections of April and June 2001 should be outside the 
twelve-month bribe windows of both the 2002 and 2003 surveys. However, there were municipal 
and regional elections on 17 November 2002, which would be inside the window for many 2002 
and 2003 respondents. 
The Ministry of Industry, Tourism, Integration and International Commercial Negotiation 
(MITINCI) issues permits for businesses, and the National Identification Registry issues identity 12 
documents and certificates of birth, marriage or divorce. The social security agency (ESSALUD) 
provides a wide variety of health-related services, such as clinics and hospitals, professional 
rehabilitation, health and disability insurance and worker’s compensation. Reasons to bribe state 
hospitals (in principle distinct from those run by the social security agency) range from wanting 
to visit a patient outside visiting hours, to obtaining a  certificate of health, to accessing the 
desired doctor. The main reason to bribe the water, electricity and telephone utilities is to speed 
up connections. The main reason to bribe state schools is to ensure registration of one’s child at 
the  appropriate  school  (the  Parent-Teachers’  Association  typically  collects  this  bribe).  The 
development  agency  (FONCODES)  could  be  bribed  for  a  (typically  agricultural)  loan.  State 
banks could be bribed to receive a loan or to be placed at the head of the long queue to pay the 
fine for not voting. Customs could be bribed to let goods enter or leave the country, and the tax 
authority in the same institution (SUNAT), known for its predatory ways, could be bribed not to 
do a tax audit, or possibly to lower tax liability. The food agency (PRONAA) could be bribed to 
judge that a family is eligible for food aid. 
 
Empirical strategy 
I analyze bribery rates and average bribe amounts in two steps. For bribery rates, I begin with the 
full data set of household/official pairs (21 officials times 36 000 households), and extract those 
91 668 household/official pairs where the household used the official. I estimate the following 
probit regression for the probability of household i having a bribery episode with official type j: 
P(Bribeij) = α1jµj + Xiβ1 + β2Zij + εij.         (1) 
The variables are defined as follows. The official type dummies are µj; Zij represents the 
number of visits the household made to the official type (possibly for more than one purpose); 
and Xi includes controls for the value of household consumption, respondent and household 13 
demographics, education, job type, student status, ownership of vehicles, location and time. The 
Appendix lists the covariates in detail, and discusses the computation of the standard errors. 
The  estimated  coefficients 
∧
α1j  on  the  official  type  dummies  µj  are  the  bribery  rates 
adjusted  for  the  characteristics  of  the  clients.  In  a  second  step  I  use  them  as  the  dependent 
variable in a weighted least squares regression at the official type level: 
 
∧
α1j = γ + φOj + ηj,              (2) 
where  the  Oj  are  the  characteristics  of  the  officials.  Because  coefficients  from  non-linear 
regressions like the probit of equation 1 are difficult to interpret, when displaying the adjusted 
bribery rates graphically I most often present the marginal effects (the effect of increasing the 
covariate by one) instead. 
I use as weights either the inverse of the squared standard errors of 
∧
α1j in the first stage 
(equation 1), or the share of the households that use the official type. The first set of weights 
reflects how precisely the coefficients were estimated in the first stage, but in practice these 
weights do not differ much across official types.
9 The second set of weights reflects directly that 
bribery rates are measured with different precision by official type because of large differences 
in the number of clients using them. 
  I proceed similarly  for  the bribe amount.  In the first stage  I use the sample of 1628 
household/official pairs  where  a bribe was paid and the amount specified, and run the OLS 
regression 
    log (bribe amountij) = α2jµj + Xiβ3 + β4Zij + υij,        (3) 
                                                 
9 Borjas and Sueyoshi (1994) show that when the first stage is a probit, the weights necessary to 
recover the coefficients that would have obtained in a one step procedure are more complicated 
than the inverse of the squared standard errors. I show that the results are not sensitive to the 
weights. 14 
where µj, Xi and Zij are as in equation 1. The estimated coefficients 
∧
α2j on the official type 
dummies µj are the adjusted bribe amounts, and in the second stage I use them as the dependent 
variable in a weighted least squares regression with the same form as equation 2. The weights are 
either the inverse of the squared standard errors of the official type coefficients from the first 
stage or the number of reported bribe amounts for the official type. 
  I  seek  to  capture  in  Oj  observable  characteristics  of  officials  representing  factors 
identified  as  important  in  the  introduction.  Firstly,  I  compute  an  adjusted  conclusion  rate  to 
represent the variation in service provision across official types net of client characteristics and 
behavior. This is designed to capture queues, red tape and other reasons for slow or ineffectual 
service that are unrelated to bribery. Respondents are  asked  whether their business with the 
official type was concluded (“concluyó”). As in English, the Spanish is ambiguous as to whether 
conclusion  implies  successful  conclusion.  The  one  word  question  “concluyó?”  is  beside  the 
column where the number of visits to the official is recorded, and both are under the heading 
asking how many times the respondents went to the official (in the previous twelve months). In 
this  context,  it  is  likely  that  the  respondents  interpreted  the  question  about  conclusion  as  a 
question as to whether they were still in the process of dealing with the official.
10 The mean 
across households is 93 per cent, with the means by official type ranging from 54 per cent for the 
judiciary and 72 per cent for the Ministry of Agriculture to 98 per cent for state schools (see 
column 5 of Table 1).  
                                                 
10 I assume without evidence that respondents forced to pay off police officers to avoid fines for 
imaginary  offences  also  interpret  the  question  as  asking  whether  they  are  still  engaged  in 
dealings with the officer. 15 
I run a probit with the same covariates as for equation 1, excluding the number of visits 
Zij, where the dependent variable is whether the client i concluded her business with the official 
j:  
P(Concluded businessij) = α3jµj + Xiβ5 + ξij.          (4) 
Because the conclusion of business is influenced by bribery behavior, I run this regression on a 
sample of household/official pairs where there was no bribery episode. I refer to the estimated 
coefficients 
∧
α3j on the official type dummies as the adjusted conclusion rate, and use them as one 
of the covariates in Oj.  
I assume that neither the average bribery rate nor the average amount paid for the official 
type belongs in equation 4 (that is, that they are not among the official characteristics being 
captured by the official type dummies µj). This is important: if speed at which officials conclude 
business honestly is affected by how many of their colleagues are taking bribes and/or how much 
they are taking in bribes, the adjusted conclusion rate will be endogenous in equation 2. For 
example,  if  corruption  demoralizes  honest  officials  or  otherwise  reduces  effort  in  honest 
dealings, the coefficient on the adjusted conclusion rate in equation 2 will be biased downward, 
and any beneficial effect of fast conclusion overstated. A related point is that the sample includes 
some clients who did not notice that their slow service indicated the official was angling for a 
bribe. If dishonest and honest officials differ in ability, the adjusted conclusion rate would also 
not measure the conclusion rate that would obtain if all officials behaved honestly. Finally, if 
some respondents perceive the question about conclusion to mean successful conclusion, and if 
some of these respondents judge success based on whether the official was willing to perform an 
illegal act for the client, a high conclusion rate is not unambiguously a good thing. 16 
  The second variable I include in Oj is the response rate to the question on the amount of 
the bribe paid. This functions as a selection correction, in case those who did not report the 
amount were disproportionately those who paid large bribes, and in case officials whose clients 
were loath to report the amount of the bribe had clients who also underreported bribing at all. 
The response rate over all clients is 98 per cent, but is much lower for the food agency compared 
to any other official type: 50 per cent, compared to 86 per cent for the official type with the next 
lowest response rate. 
  A third set of variables included in Oj is the means of client characteristics by official 
type. Because the impact of individual client characteristics has already been incorporated, these 
means  represent  the  indirect  effects  of  other  clients’  characteristics.  For  example,  if  official 
scruples are endogenous and are weakened in the face of temptation, a client may be more likely 
to  have  to  bribe  if  the  other  clients  are  rich.  Alternatively,  if  the  other  clients  are  rich,  the 
institution  will  attract  less  scrupulous  officials,  increasing  the  bribery  rate  for  all  clients.  I 
experimented unsuccessfully with a proxy for a fourth characteristic of officials: the value of the 
benefit the official has in his power (how much is at stake). 
  If a higher conclusion rate reduces bribery by reducing the number of clients disgruntled 
with the service, the correct specification for equation 2 is slightly different. In this case, Oj 
should include a measure of client satisfaction, which should be instrumented by the conclusion 
rate. The coefficient on the satisfaction variable would then reflect the effect on bribery of a 
change in satisfaction caused by a change in the conclusion rate.   
  Such a measure of satisfaction is available: respondents are asked to rate the quality of 
service as good, medium or bad. Thirty-four per cent of clients rate their service as good; nine 
per cent as bad. As shown in column 6 of Table 1, the share of clients rating the service as bad 17 
ranges from 38 per cent for the police to 4 per cent for state schools. I create, by official type, an 
adjusted share of clients reporting bad service, using an adjustment procedure identical to that 
used for the conclusion rate. I include this variable in Oj and instrument it with the adjusted 
conclusion  rate.  To  test  for  robustness,  I  alternatively  instrument  with  the  adjusted  share  of 
clients who reported seeing the official immediately, and replace the share of clients reporting 
bad service with the share reporting good service. 
 
Raw and adjusted bribery rates and average bribe amounts 
Figure 2 indicates the raw bribery episode rates by official type and the associated 95 per cent 
confidence intervals, with the vertical line at 0.048 giving the city government rate as a reference 
point. Thirty-seven per cent of those using the police and 17 per cent of those using the judiciary 
had a bribery episode; bribery at the telephone and electric authorities was negligible. 
Figure 3 shows the adjusted bribery rates (marginal effects, with the city government 
coefficient normalized to zero) and the associated confidence intervals. The adjustment reduces 
the confidence intervals (the scales are different in the two figures) and explains much of the 
difference between the very corrupt officials and the others, but does not change the ranking of 
the officials much. Figure 4 makes clearer that a large amount of the variance across official 
types is explained by client characteristics. It plots the raw and adjusted bribery rates on the same 
figure (with the city government bribery rate subtracted from the raw rates). The unweighted 
standard deviation of the 21 raw bribery rates is 0.084, while the unweighted standard deviation 
of the 21 adjusted bribery rates is 0.032, so two-thirds of the standard deviation, or 85 per cent of 
the variance, is explained by household characteristics. Client characteristics explain most of the 
(statistically significant) difference in the bribery rate between the judiciary and city government 
and more than half the difference between the police and city government. The adjusted judiciary 18 
and police bribery rates remain significantly higher than that of city government, however.  The 
adjustment brings the lower bribery group, from the election office on down, slightly closer to 
the city government, although the gap remains statistically significant.
11 
I repeat this exercise for the bribe amount in Figures 5-7. The large confidence intervals 
of Figure 5, which reports raw means of log bribe amounts, reflect the small number of reported 
bribe amounts for some types of official. The highest “mean” is for the election court, where in 
fact only one bribe amount (of 80 Nuevo soles, or about US $24) is reported; the second ranked 
institution, the Ministry of Industry, also has only one bribe amount reported. The judiciary, 
which  by  contrast  has  many  bribes  and  a  tight  confidence  interval,  is  in  third  rank,  closely 
followed by “other”, arbitration, social security and the police.
12 The difference between the 
judiciary and the police is statistically significant, but many other gaps are not.  
Of the 2.1 per cent of bribes that are 500 Nuevo soles or more (US $150), 47 per cent 
went to the judiciary; of the 1.2 per cent of bribes (19 bribes) that are 1000 Nuevo soles or more 
(US $300), 53 per cent went to the judiciary. The highest reported bribe is 15 000 Nuevo soles 
(about US$ 4500), to the judiciary, compared to bribes of between $2500 and $10,000 paid by 
Montesinos to ordinary judges (McMillan and Zoido 2004). 
The adjusted bribe amounts in Figure 6 have tighter confidence intervals and have some 
small ranking differences compared to the raw bribe means in Figure 5. However, as Figure 7 
makes clear, the adjustment scarcely affects the size of the gaps between the official types (the 
unweighted variance of 0.67 actually rises to 0.71). Although bribery rates vary across official 
                                                 
11 Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) discuss subtleties associated with measuring the variance 
of the coefficients on such group effects. 
12 The ranking of average bribes, rather than average log bribes, is different: judiciary (mean 260 
Nuevo soles, or US $78), other (144), election court (80), arbitration (72), police (50), Ministry 
of Industry (50). 19 
types in large part because client profiles vary across official types, the variance in the size of 
bribes paid across official types is almost unrelated to these different profiles, and must instead 
be almost fully determined by differences in the institutions themselves. 
Given these results, one can understand why the plots marked with circles in Figure 8 
show little relation between the official types with high raw bribery rates and the official types 
with high raw average bribe amounts. The plots marked with crosses show that there is also no 
correlation between the adjusted rates and the adjusted bribe amounts. 
 
Determinants of adjusted bribery rates and adjusted bribe amounts 
Figure 9 plots the adjusted bribery rate (coefficients now, rather than  marginal effects as in 
earlier graphs) against the adjusted rate of concluding business with officials, and the unweighted 
regression line connecting them. The fit is very good, with only the police rather far from the 
regression line: the police have a higher bribery rate than would be expected given their rate of 
concluding business. This might be the result of the latitude enjoyed by police officers to seek 
out their own clients and impose a fine if a bribe is not forthcoming (inspectors of various kinds 
also  have  this  latitude):  such  actions  are  intimately  associated  with  bribery  but  are  often 
concluded  on  the  spot.  Alternatively,  clients  of  the  police  may  have  fewer  (unobservable) 
scruples. 
The  first  column  of  Table  2  shows  that  in  the  regression  with  weights  based  on  the 
standard errors from the first (household/official) stage, the adjusted business conclusion rate 
alone explains 46 per cent of the variance in the bribery rate, and has a t-statistic of -4.0. In 
column 2 I add the response rate for the bribe amount, which is insignificant and does not affect 
the coefficient on the conclusion rate. To make the coefficients easy to interpret, I rerun the 
regression  of  column  2 performing  all  adjustments  to  obtain  the  dependent  and  independent 20 
variables using OLS, rather than using any probits. The resulting coefficient on the adjusted 
conclusion  rate,  in  column  3,  indicates  that  a  10  percentage  point  increase  in  this  rate  (the 
unweighted standard deviation) reduces the adjusted bribery rate by 3.8 percentage points, a very 
large effect. 
The first three columns suggest that when conclusion rates are low, clients get frustrated 
and bribe. To check that dissatisfaction with service is indeed the correct mechanism, I control 
for the adjusted share of clients saying service was bad, instead of the adjusted conclusion rate, 
in column 4, and instrument it with the adjusted conclusion rate in column 5.  In both columns, 
the coefficient on bad service is positive and significant, as expected, with a larger absolute value 
than the conclusion coefficient of columns 1 and 2. In column 6 I repeat column 5 with different 
weights, the share of households using the official type, which reduces the coefficient on the bad 
service variable.  
To help interpret the coefficients, in column 7 I rerun the column 6 regression making 
adjustments using OLS only. The coefficient of 0.76 indicates that a 10 percentage point increase 
in the share of clients who think the service is bad increases the bribery rate by 7.6 percentage 
points. We can use the coefficient on the conclusion rate in the first stage of the IV regression,  
-0.65  (lower  panel  of  column  7),  to  relate  this  coefficient  to  the  direct  coefficient  on  the 
conclusion  rate  in  column  3  (-0.38).  A  10  percentage  point  increase  in  the  conclusion  rate 
reduces the share of clients rating service as bad by 6.5 percentage points, which in turn reduces 
bribery by 0.76*6.5= 4.9 percentage points, similar to the 3.8 percentage point effect of column 
3. The results are very similar when the first set of weights (from columns 1-5) is used.  
 The  next  step  is  to  add  to  the  covariates  the  third  component  of  Oj:    average 
characteristics of clients, particularly the value of household consumption and the share of clients 21 
in various types of job such as white collar and self-employed in agriculture (see the Appendix). 
Household consumption has a significant positive coefficient if the job categories are included, 
but  not  otherwise.  Certain  job  category  coefficients  are  significant,  but  only  if  household 
consumption  is  included.  These  unreported  results  are  somewhat  difficult  to  interpret.  They 
might imply indirect or spillover effects between clients or indicate that unscrupulous officials 
gravitate to institutions with bribe-prone clients. 
The corresponding regressions for the adjusted log bribe amounts are presented in Table 
3; Figure 10 graphs the adjusted bribe amount against the adjusted conclusion rate (showing 
coefficients,  not  marginal  effects).  Columns  1  and  2  and  the  figure  show  that  the  adjusted 
business conclusion rate is significantly negatively related to the log bribe amount when the 
official types are weighted similarly (in the table) or equally (the regression line of the figure). 
The fit is not as good as in the case of the bribery rates, however, with only 20 per cent of the 
variance in the bribe amount explained. In column 2, as in later columns, the response rate for 
the bribe amount has an insignificant coefficient. The fully linear version of column 2, presented 
in column 3, indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in the conclusion rate reduces the bribe 
amount by 38 log points or 32 percent, a large effect. 
In columns 4 and 5 I control for the share of clients reporting bad service, rather than the 
conclusion  rate.  This  variable  has  an  insignificant  coefficient  when  not  instrumented,  but  a 
positive coefficient significant at the 10 per cent level when instrumented in column 5. The 
coefficient becomes smaller but much more significant when the weights are the number of bribe 
amounts reported, in column 6: the increased significance comes from the low weight on the 
observations from the Figure 10 regression line owing to their being based on a tiny number of 
bribes. 22 
The fully linear results of column 7 indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
share of clients reporting bad service reduces the bribe amount by a statistically significant 58.9 
log points (45 per cent), and the unadjusted R-squared rises to 0.43. Because the first stage 
coefficient  on  the  conclusion  rate  is  -0.60  (column  7  lower  panel),  this  means  that  a  10 
percentage point increase in the conclusion rate reduces the bribe amount by 0.60*58.9=35 log 
points, or 30 per cent. This is very similar to the direct effect of 38 log points in column 3.  
As  was  the  case  for  the  bribery  rate,  average  client  household  consumption  is  a 
significant determinant of the bribe amount only if the share of clients in various job categories 
are included, and vice versa. When all these covariates are included, the significant coefficients 
have  opposite  signs  from  the  bribery  rate  regression  (these  results  are  not  reported).  More 
research is needed to characterize indirect or spillover effects between clients. 
I have repeated the instrumental variables regressions of Tables 2 and 3 using the share of 
clients reporting good, rather than bad, service. The conclusion rate has a larger and much more 
significant effect on the number of clients judging service to be bad than on the number judging 
service to be good. Thus, the impact of the conclusion rate on bribery works not through creating 
happy clients, but rather through reducing the number of unhappy clients. Unreported regressions 
also  indicate  that  using  as  an  instrument  the  adjusted  share  of  clients  who  saw  the  official 
immediately works well (and predicts bad service better than good service) and gives similar 
results to Tables 2 and 3. Allowing clients to see the official immediately is a good first step in 
speeding up the conclusion rate, increasing client satisfaction and lowering bribery. 
 
Conclusion  
Peruvian data on bribery rates and on household bribe payments indicate that almost all the 
variance in bribery rates across types of officials can be explained by client characteristics and 23 
by  the  share  of  cases  that  officials  acting  honestly  are  able  to  conclude  (adjusted  for  client 
characteristics).  A  ten  percentage  point  increase  in  the  adjusted  conclusion  rate  (a  standard 
deviation) reduces the bribery rate net of client characteristics by 4-5  percentage points.  By 
contrast, the bribe amounts paid to different official types are unaffected by client characteristics 
and are uncorrelated with the bribery rates. However, a ten percentage point rise in the adjusted 
conclusion rate reduces the average amount of the bribe by 30-32 per cent. The effect of the 
conclusion rate is causal if the conclusion rate of officials acting honestly is independent of the 
degree of corruption of their colleagues.  
Although it is inevitable that different types of officials serve client pools that differ in 
their propensity to bribe, the results indicate that speeding up clients’ dealings with officials 
would  be  very  helpful  in  reducing  bribery  rates  and  amounts.  The  rate  at  which  officials 
conclude cases should be easier to monitor than bribery itself, but care must be taken to avoid a 
decline  in  service  quality.  Cutting  red  tape,  providing  more  resources  and  improving 
administrative efficiency should all help.  
I find some evidence that the characteristics of the official’s other clients help to explain 
a given client’s bribery behavior. However, the results differ qualitatively depending on whether 
one considers the bribery rate or bribe amount, and are difficult to interpret. I therefore draw no 
firm conclusions concerning indirect or spillover effects, or the concentration of unscrupulous 
officials in institutions with bribe-prone clients. I speculate that both for the bribe amount and 
bribery rates, the stakes and the degree of internal competition play a role in explaining the 
remaining variance. 
The judiciary is by far the most corrupt institution in Peru, with both a high bribery rate 
and a high value of bribes, and it has by far the lowest conclusion rate. Only 54 per cent of 24 
clients concluded their business with the judiciary within the 12 month window of the survey. 
The magnitude of the effects uncovered suggests considerable scope for reducing the bribery rate 
by  speeding  up  Peru’s  infamously  slow  judicial  proceedings.  This  will  require  a  sustained 
investment in attracting and training more lawyers and judges and providing these judges with 
permanent contracts. Faster proceedings would also help reduce the high value of the bribes paid 
to  the  judiciary,  but  the  inevitably  high  stakes,  low  internal  competition  and  unwilling 
participation of defendants associated with judicial proceedings may be significant obstacles to 
progress.  
The police are also highly corrupt in Peru: although the value of bribes paid is not much 
above average, the bribery rate is the highest of any official type, at 37 per cent. The police have 
a much higher bribery rate than their conclusion rate warrants. This suggests that other, possibly 
more difficult to implement reforms, must supplement an increase in  the conclusion rate. A 
peculiarity of the police -- that they can extort bribes from clients of their choosing, may well 
explain this, and should be a target of policy. The police may also deal with clients with fewer 
scruples than average, something that policy cannot influence. 25 
Data and Regression Appendix 
 
The 2002 survey contains information from interviews in October-December 2002. The “2003” 
survey contains information from interviews in every month from May 2003 to April 2004. I 
have made no adjustments for inflation nor for seasonality consumption patterns, and simply use 
the total value of household consumption as computed by the statistical office. The statistical 
office imputes some components of consumption where necessary. Two thousand of the 18 000 
addresses interviewed in 2002 were re-interviewed in the 2003 survey. 
 
Regressions at the household/official level to adjust the bribery rate and bribe amount include: 
the number of visits to the official type, seven regional dummies, household size dummies, town 
size dummies, dummies for interview months from May 2003-April 2004, time to the district 
administrative  center;  “job  type”  dummies  for  the  respondent’s  main  job  --  employer  (non-
agricultural),  employer  (agricultural),  self-employed  (non-agricultural),  self-employed 
(agricultural), white collar, domestic worker, unpaid family member, other and not employed 
(the  omitted  type  is  laborer);  characteristics  of  the  respondent  --  sex,  married/cohabiting, 
married/cohabiting*sex,  age  and  age  squared,  student  status,  whether  main  job  is  in  public 
administration; characteristics of the household -- number of earners, number of members in 
school, ownership dummies for bicycle, car/van, tricycle, motorbike and truck, whether land 
obtained  by  invasion,  presence  of  children  aged  0-3,  4-7,  8-11  and  12-15  and  whether  any 
member other than the respondent had each of the several job types.  
 
The  regressions  used  to  adjust  the  probability  of  concluding  business  with  the  official,  the 
perceived quality of service and the probability of seeing an official immediately contain the 
same covariates, excluding the number of visits, but the sample contains only respondents who 
did  not  experience  a  bribery  episode.  The  standard  errors  in  all  regressions  at  the 
household/official level are clustered by district, allowing for correlation of the errors across 
residents of the same district in any survey period. This procedure takes into account that people 
in the same district might have similar behaviors, and that in fact panel households appear twice 
in the sample. 26 
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Table 1: Shares of Bribes, Bribe Payments and Sample by Official Type 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Share of 
bribery 
episodes 
Share of 
amount 
of bribe 
payments 
Share of 
household- 
official 
interactions 
Corruption 
index  
(2)/(3) 
Business 
conclusion 
rate 
Clients 
reporting 
bad 
service 
Police  0.35  0.27  0.02  12.7  0.81  0.38 
City government  0.21  0.11  0.10  1.1  0.90  0.13 
Judiciary  0.12  0.42  0.02  26.3  0.54  0.36 
State schools  0.08  0.05  0.21  0.2  0.98  0.04 
State hospitals  0.04  0.02  0.13  0.2  0.93  0.10 
National ID registry  0.04  0.02  0.06  0.3  0.88  0.11 
Water  0.03  0.01  0.12  0.1  0.95  0.09 
Other  0.03  0.05  0.01  3.9  0.78  0.21 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
0.02  0.01  0.01  1.1  0.72  0.15 
State banks  0.02  0.004  0.06  0.06  0.95  0.07 
Social security  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.3  0.88  0.16 
Electricity  0.02  0.003  0.14  0.02  0.96  0.05 
Department of 
Migration 
0.01  0.003  0.004  0.9  0.91  0.11 
Customs and taxes  0.02  0.05  0.92  0.07 
Election office  0.004  0.6  0.86  0.10 
Telephone  0.04  0.001  0.95  0.09 
Development 
agency 
0.5  0.76  0.11 
Arbitration  1.0  0.87  0.10 
Election court  0.4  0.90  0.07 
Food agency  0.02  0.81  0.16 
Ministry of Industry  
 
 
Less 
than 1% 
each 
 
 
Less than 
1% each   
Less than 
1% each 
0.4  0.83  0.10 
All  1  1  1  1  0.93  0.09 
Observations  2123  1628  91 668  --  91 668  91 668 
 
Notes: Bribery episodes include cases where the client refused to bribe (463). A number of bribe 
payers do not report the amount of the bribe (32). The Ministry of Industry is an abbreviation for 
the Ministry of Industry, Tourism, Integration and International Commercial Negotiation. 29 
Table 2: Determinants of Adjusted Bribery Rates by Official Type 
(T-statistics in parentheses) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Business conclusion 
rate (adjusted) 
-0.98 
(-4.0) 
-1.00 
(-4.1) 
-0.38 
(-2.5) 
--  --  --  -- 
Share clients saying 
service bad 
(adjusted) 
--  --  --  1.58 
(5.1) 
1.70 
(4.6) 
1.12 
(3.2) 
0.76 
(3.1) 
Response rate for 
bribe amount  
--  1.41 
(1.3) 
0.12 
(0.9) 
1.42 
(1.4) 
1.45 
(1.5) 
1.81 
(0.8) 
0.06 
(0.3) 
R-squared  0.46  0.50  0.27  0.60  0.60  0.41  0.48 
Adjusted R-squared  0.43  0.45  0.19  0.56  0.55  0.35  0.42 
Instrumental 
variables  
--  --  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted conclusion  
rate (in first stage) 
--  --  --  --  -0.59 
(-6.6) 
-0.71 
(-11.1) 
-0.65 
(-8.3) 
All adjustments 
made using OLS 
--  --  Yes  --  --  --  Yes 
Weights  Reciprocal of squared standard errors from 
household-official level regression 
Share of households 
using official 
 
Notes: Weighted regressions on 21 observations. The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the 
set of coefficients on the official type dummies in a probit for the probability of paying a bribe. 
The adjusted business conclusion rate is the set of coefficients on official type dummies from a 
probit for the probability of concluding business with the official. The adjusted share of clients 
reporting bad service is the set of coefficients on official type dummies from a probit for the 
probability of experiencing bad service with the official. For columns 3 and 7 all adjustments to 
variables are made using OLS. Where instrumental variables is performed, the adjusted share of 
clients reporting bad service has been instrumented with the adjusted business conclusion rate. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Adjusted Bribe Amounts by Official Type 
(T-statistics in parentheses) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Business 
conclusion rate 
(adjusted) 
-0.85 
(-2.1) 
-0.90 
(-2.3) 
-3.83 
(-2.1) 
--  --  --  -- 
Share clients saying 
service bad 
(adjusted) 
--  ---  --  0.46 
(0.8) 
1.58 
(1.9) 
1.09 
(4.2) 
5.89 
(4.9) 
Response rate for 
bribe amount  
--  2.56 
(1.5) 
2.50 
(1.5) 
2.42 
(1.3) 
2.84 
(1.4) 
-3.1 
(-0.8) 
-2.63 
(-0.7) 
R-squared  0.20  0.29  0.26  0.10  --  0.36  0.43 
Adjusted R-squared  0.15  0.21  0.18  0.00  --  0.29  0.36 
Instrumental 
variables  
--  --  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted 
conclusion rate (in 
first stage) 
--  --  --  --  -0.57 
(-5.8) 
-0.68 
(-9.6) 
-0.60 
(-6.9) 
All adjustments 
made using OLS 
--  --  Yes  --  --  --  Yes 
Weights  Reciprocal of squared standard errors from 
household-official level regression 
Number of bribe 
amounts reported 
 
Notes: Weighted regressions on 20 observations. The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the 
set of coefficients on the official type dummies in an OLS regression for the (log) amount of the 
bribe. The adjusted business conclusion rate is the set of coefficients on official type dummies 
from a probit for the probability of concluding business with the official. The adjusted share of 
clients reporting bad service is the set of coefficients on official type dummies from a probit for 
the probability of experiencing bad service with the official. For columns 6 all adjustments to 
variables are made using OLS. Where instrumental variables is performed, the adjusted share of 
clients reporting bad service has been instrumented with the adjusted business conclusion rate. 
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